(The following is Copyright © 2009 Alexander M. (Sandy) Davis. To find out more about Sandy Davis and the resilience-related manuals, programs, services, and newsletter he offers, visit http://www.resilienceworks.com.)
Developing Resilience-Readiness via Ongoing “Micro-Preparation”
The process of continually meeting small daily challenges that you intentionally set for yourself [i.e., handling well-chosen micro-disruptions] amounts to “micro-preparation.” It is akin to lifting weights.
If you want to strengthen your muscles, all you need to do is to start working with weights in such a way as to stress your muscles repeatedly, in small daily ways. At first, you won’t see much change. But as you methodically develop an ability to lift heavier weights and increase your repetitions, you can both strengthen your muscles and increase your overall physical power. The results of stressing your muscles in this slow, steady, and deliberate manner are predictable, and, indeed, they are all but inexorable.
In a similar way, you can strengthen your figurative resilience-readiness “muscles.” Instead of lifting physical weights that stress your body’s actual muscles, you can use intentional micro-disruptions to gently stress your whole self in whatever worthy ways you choose.
Once you make the process of enhancing your resilience-readiness through micro-preparation a longstanding daily habit, when “the big one” (i.e., a full-scale catastrophe) finally comes along, you will find yourself to be well-practiced and fully prepared to handle just about any disruption with surprising ease. Your resilience-readiness “muscles” will be strong.
Why Choose Self-Care Challenges?
If you decide you would like to use this process of micro-preparation to strengthen your resilience-readiness, the most effective and rewarding small challenges to practice on are those that pertain directly to your own daily self-care.
When it comes to taking good care of ourselves, most of us tend to cut corners. Because we tend to assume that we are virtually invulnerable, we imagine we can afford to neglect the very things that are most central to leading a long, healthy, and fulfilling life. We are prone to overlook the importance of making ongoing investments in our health, our well-being, and our natural creativity. This oversight can land us in big trouble.
When you fail to take good care of your own “power plant,” you can expect to live a life in which you will likely face major setbacks such as significant health challenges, a chronic lack of energy and stamina, a discouraging lack of engagement with your work, debilitating boredom, depression, and/or a near-total lack of personal fulfillment. In other words, you will most likely be neither healthy nor happy.
The good news is that all of the above personal setbacks are largely avoidable. By making small daily investments in your own self-care, you can safeguard yourself from being set back by these and other personal misfortunes. Moreover, you can do so relatively quickly, painlessly, and in a manner that is easy to sustain. (If you are already experiencing any of the above misfortunes, sustained improvements in your self-care can greatly accelerate your recuperation.)
The bad news (or at least it may appear to you at first to be bad news) is that you first have to choose worthwhile self-care “practice” challenges, and then you have to actually do the work required to meet those micro-challenges successfully. When you do, how you experience your own life will start to shift in positive ways—more often than not both quickly and dramatically. And you will be pleased.
"Disruptions are inherently stressful. They seed change.
Intentional disruptions seed intentional change."
– Sandy Davis
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Vicarious Trauma -- Video Explanation
Dear viewers,
Do let me know if this video's language and flow work for you. Also, let me know what else you would like to know in future videos.
Monday, June 8, 2009
...circumstances don't determine happiness...
From a piece called The Joy of Less by Pico Iyer
“The beat of my heart has grown deeper, more active, and yet more peaceful, and it is as if I were all the time storing up inner riches…My [life] is one long sequence of inner miracles.” The young Dutchwoman Etty Hillesum wrote that in a Nazi transit camp in 1943, on her way to her death at Auschwitz two months later. Towards the end of his life, Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “All I have seen teaches me to trust the creator for all I have not seen,” though by then he had already lost his father when he was 7, his first wife when she was 20 and his first son, aged 5. In Japan, the late 18th-century poet Issa is celebrated for his delighted, almost child-like celebrations of the natural world. Issa saw four children die in infancy, his wife die in childbirth, and his own body partially paralyzed.
“The beat of my heart has grown deeper, more active, and yet more peaceful, and it is as if I were all the time storing up inner riches…My [life] is one long sequence of inner miracles.” The young Dutchwoman Etty Hillesum wrote that in a Nazi transit camp in 1943, on her way to her death at Auschwitz two months later. Towards the end of his life, Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “All I have seen teaches me to trust the creator for all I have not seen,” though by then he had already lost his father when he was 7, his first wife when she was 20 and his first son, aged 5. In Japan, the late 18th-century poet Issa is celebrated for his delighted, almost child-like celebrations of the natural world. Issa saw four children die in infancy, his wife die in childbirth, and his own body partially paralyzed.
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Finding Stillness
A voice coach on Robert Frost's poem re being in the woods:
http://www.judyringer.com/media/StoppingByWoods.mp3 *
*Copyright © 2009 by Judy Ringer
From: Sandy Davis | Sandy@ResilienceWorks.com | 207-563-7263
Author | Speaker | Authority on Zillience/Resilience | Resilience Trainer
ResilienceWorks LLC | P.O. Box 1011, Damariscotta, ME 04543-1011
http://www.ResilienceWorks.com | http://www.ResilienceCircle.com
http://www.judyringer.com/media/StoppingByWoods.mp3 *
*Copyright © 2009 by Judy Ringer
From: Sandy Davis | Sandy@ResilienceWorks.com | 207-563-7263
Author | Speaker | Authority on Zillience/Resilience | Resilience Trainer
ResilienceWorks LLC | P.O. Box 1011, Damariscotta, ME 04543-1011
http://www.ResilienceWorks.com | http://www.ResilienceCircle.com
Friday, May 8, 2009
Surrender
Willing to experience aloneness, I discover connection everywhere.
Turning to face my fear, I meet the warrior who lives within.
Opening to my loss, I gain the embrace of the Universe.
Surrendering to emptiness, I find fullness without end.
Each condition I flee from pursues me.
Each condition I welcome transforms me,
and becomes itself transformed into its radiant jewel-like essence.
I bow to the one who has made it so; who has crafted this Master Game.
To play it is pure delight.
To honor its form, true devotion.
Jennifer Wellwood
Turning to face my fear, I meet the warrior who lives within.
Opening to my loss, I gain the embrace of the Universe.
Surrendering to emptiness, I find fullness without end.
Each condition I flee from pursues me.
Each condition I welcome transforms me,
and becomes itself transformed into its radiant jewel-like essence.
I bow to the one who has made it so; who has crafted this Master Game.
To play it is pure delight.
To honor its form, true devotion.
Jennifer Wellwood
only the real can free you
Yoga means that now there is no hope, now there is no future, now there are no desires. One is not interested in what can be, what should be, what ought to be. One is not interested! One is only interested in that which is, because only the real can free you, only the reality can become liberation.
Bhagwan S. Rajneesh Yoga: The science of the soul (Rajneeshpuram, OR: Rajneesh Foundation International, 1976), pp. 6-7.
Bhagwan S. Rajneesh Yoga: The science of the soul (Rajneeshpuram, OR: Rajneesh Foundation International, 1976), pp. 6-7.
Saturday, April 25, 2009
On the Use of Torture
April 23, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor for the New York Times
My Tortured Decision
By ALI SOUFAN
FOR seven years I have remained silent about the false claims magnifying the effectiveness of the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques like waterboarding. I have spoken only in closed government hearings, as these matters were classified. But the release last week of four Justice Department memos on interrogations allows me to shed light on the story, and on some of the lessons to be learned.
One of the most striking parts of the memos is the false premises on which they are based. The first, dated August 2002, grants authorization to use harsh interrogation techniques on a high-ranking terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, on the grounds that previous methods hadn’t been working. The next three memos cite the successes of those methods as a justification for their continued use.
It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had been uncooperative. Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002, before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important actionable intelligence.
We discovered, for example, that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah also told us about Jose Padilla, the so-called dirty bomber. This experience fit what I had found throughout my counterterrorism career: traditional interrogation techniques are successful in identifying operatives, uncovering plots and saving lives.
There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than a few occasions — all of which are still classified. The short sightedness behind the use of these techniques ignored the unreliability of the methods, the nature of the threat, the mentality and modus operandi of the terrorists, and due process.
Defenders of these techniques have claimed that they got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a top aide to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Mr. Padilla. This is false. The information that led to Mr. Shibh’s capture came primarily from a different terrorist operative who was interviewed using traditional methods. As for Mr. Padilla, the dates just don’t add up: the harsh techniques were approved in the memo of August 2002, Mr. Padilla had been arrested that May.
One of the worst consequences of the use of these harsh techniques was that it reintroduced the so-called Chinese wall between the C.I.A. and F.B.I., similar to the communications obstacles that prevented us from working together to stop the 9/11 attacks. Because the bureau would not employ these problematic techniques, our agents who knew the most about the terrorists could have no part in the investigation. An F.B.I. colleague of mine who knew more about Khalid Shaikh Mohammed than anyone in the government was not allowed to speak to him.
It was the right decision to release these memos, as we need the truth to come out. This should not be a partisan matter, because it is in our national security interest to regain our position as the world’s foremost defenders of human rights. Just as important, releasing these memos enables us to begin the tricky process of finally bringing these terrorists to justice.
The debate after the release of these memos has centered on whether C.I.A. officials should be prosecuted for their role in harsh interrogation techniques. That would be a mistake. Almost all the agency officials I worked with on these issues were good people who felt as I did about the use of enhanced techniques: it is un-American, ineffective and harmful to our national security.
Fortunately for me, after I objected to the enhanced techniques, the message came through from Pat D’Amuro, an F.B.I. assistant director, that “we don’t do that,” and I was pulled out of the interrogations by the F.B.I. director, Robert Mueller (this was documented in the report released last year by the Justice Department’s inspector general).
My C.I.A. colleagues who balked at the techniques, on the other hand, were instructed to continue. (It’s worth noting that when reading between the lines of the newly released memos, it seems clear that it was contractors, not C.I.A. officers, who requested the use of these techniques.)
As we move forward, it’s important to not allow the torture issue to harm the reputation, and thus the effectiveness, of the C.I.A. The agency is essential to our national security. We must ensure that the mistakes behind the use of these techniques are never repeated. We’re making a good start: President Obama has limited interrogation techniques to the guidelines set in the Army Field Manual, and Leon Panetta, the C.I.A. director, says he has banned the use of contractors and secret overseas prisons for terrorism suspects (the so-called black sites). Just as important, we need to ensure that no new mistakes are made in the process of moving forward — a real danger right now.
Ali Soufan was an F.B.I. supervisory special agent from 1997 to 2005.
Op-Ed Contributor for the New York Times
My Tortured Decision
By ALI SOUFAN
FOR seven years I have remained silent about the false claims magnifying the effectiveness of the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques like waterboarding. I have spoken only in closed government hearings, as these matters were classified. But the release last week of four Justice Department memos on interrogations allows me to shed light on the story, and on some of the lessons to be learned.
One of the most striking parts of the memos is the false premises on which they are based. The first, dated August 2002, grants authorization to use harsh interrogation techniques on a high-ranking terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, on the grounds that previous methods hadn’t been working. The next three memos cite the successes of those methods as a justification for their continued use.
It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had been uncooperative. Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002, before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important actionable intelligence.
We discovered, for example, that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah also told us about Jose Padilla, the so-called dirty bomber. This experience fit what I had found throughout my counterterrorism career: traditional interrogation techniques are successful in identifying operatives, uncovering plots and saving lives.
There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than a few occasions — all of which are still classified. The short sightedness behind the use of these techniques ignored the unreliability of the methods, the nature of the threat, the mentality and modus operandi of the terrorists, and due process.
Defenders of these techniques have claimed that they got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a top aide to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Mr. Padilla. This is false. The information that led to Mr. Shibh’s capture came primarily from a different terrorist operative who was interviewed using traditional methods. As for Mr. Padilla, the dates just don’t add up: the harsh techniques were approved in the memo of August 2002, Mr. Padilla had been arrested that May.
One of the worst consequences of the use of these harsh techniques was that it reintroduced the so-called Chinese wall between the C.I.A. and F.B.I., similar to the communications obstacles that prevented us from working together to stop the 9/11 attacks. Because the bureau would not employ these problematic techniques, our agents who knew the most about the terrorists could have no part in the investigation. An F.B.I. colleague of mine who knew more about Khalid Shaikh Mohammed than anyone in the government was not allowed to speak to him.
It was the right decision to release these memos, as we need the truth to come out. This should not be a partisan matter, because it is in our national security interest to regain our position as the world’s foremost defenders of human rights. Just as important, releasing these memos enables us to begin the tricky process of finally bringing these terrorists to justice.
The debate after the release of these memos has centered on whether C.I.A. officials should be prosecuted for their role in harsh interrogation techniques. That would be a mistake. Almost all the agency officials I worked with on these issues were good people who felt as I did about the use of enhanced techniques: it is un-American, ineffective and harmful to our national security.
Fortunately for me, after I objected to the enhanced techniques, the message came through from Pat D’Amuro, an F.B.I. assistant director, that “we don’t do that,” and I was pulled out of the interrogations by the F.B.I. director, Robert Mueller (this was documented in the report released last year by the Justice Department’s inspector general).
My C.I.A. colleagues who balked at the techniques, on the other hand, were instructed to continue. (It’s worth noting that when reading between the lines of the newly released memos, it seems clear that it was contractors, not C.I.A. officers, who requested the use of these techniques.)
As we move forward, it’s important to not allow the torture issue to harm the reputation, and thus the effectiveness, of the C.I.A. The agency is essential to our national security. We must ensure that the mistakes behind the use of these techniques are never repeated. We’re making a good start: President Obama has limited interrogation techniques to the guidelines set in the Army Field Manual, and Leon Panetta, the C.I.A. director, says he has banned the use of contractors and secret overseas prisons for terrorism suspects (the so-called black sites). Just as important, we need to ensure that no new mistakes are made in the process of moving forward — a real danger right now.
Ali Soufan was an F.B.I. supervisory special agent from 1997 to 2005.
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